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ow laboratory markets. The General Accounting Office report (GAO, 1994) notes that allowance prices are substantially below estimates provided by the EPA, a utility industry survey, and the Electric Power Research Institute (GAO, 1994 It is tempting to draw parallels with our experiment, because both the laboratory and the field prices appear lower than expected in early trading. Moreover, prices in our continuous market systematically exceed prices m the sealed-bid auction, but after several auctions the prices in the two institutions converge.
The present experiment is designed to idente any differences in the results of the two laboratory sites. The data generally indicate no differences in the two data sets, which provides evidence to support the hypothesis that results flom these market experiments are not sensitive to subject pool and experimenter effects.
Below, Section 2 outlines the experimental design and theoretical predictions. Section 3 descn'bes the trading institutions and experimental procedure. Section 4 reports the results of our testing of replication and market outcomes (prices, trading efliciency, and intertemporal b d g ) flom the experiment. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2. Experimental Design.
Market sirzicture.
These experiments utilize a design that sets up four different k n s loosely based on characteristics of the electrical power md-.
This design consisted of two firm types; high and low; and two technology types; new and old. The fjrrn size high and low refers to the production of BWs. Old technology means higher abatements costs or greater sulfur dioxide emission per BTU and the new technology implies lower abatements costs or lower sulfur dioxide emissions per BTU.
High firms are allocated more pennits than Low firms, and old technology have higher values for pennits than did new technology. Table 1 summarizes our experimental design, which parallels some key features of the C A M and the naturally occurxing field market.
At the beginning of an experiment which consisted of 12 periods of transactions, each subject within a firmis allocated $20 as a starting balance'. In addition, permits are allocated to the f i r m s by firm type. High (Low) firms are allocated 72(36) permits, 8 (4) for each of the fist six periods and 4 (2) for each of the remaining six periods. All firms are required to submit 16% of their allocation for sale m the discriminative auction'. The number of trading periods and the d o r m 50% allocation in the last six periods is common information, but the specifk allocations and redemption values is private information.
Subjects within firms make profits either by redeeming the permits at the pre-assigned redemption values (see Appendix 1 for a summary of these parameters) or by selling the permits to other firms? m each of the transaction period. The permits can be traded either in a revenusneutral sealed-bid discriminative auction, or m a double auction (ie. a centrdize'd exchange with a public bids, asks and prices). These markets d l be discussed i n greater detail below.
It should be noted that that with a few noted exceptions the units referred to in this report are m experimental dollars which are converted to U. S. dollars at the end of each session at a fixed, pre-announced exchange rate.
As shown m Figure 1 below, and inthe Appendix, our fums had a maximum of sixteen redemption values and a maximum allocatkm of eight permits per period Using the 28% required by the CAAA, no firms would be required to submit pennits to the revenue-neutral auction (8 x 2.8% = 0.22). We chose 16% so that at least some permits would be submitted to the auction, while ensuring that the required submission was small relative to the number of the respective firm's redemption values. is achieved, then the market price wiU be a one-time shift in prices beginning in period 7, as the market will adjust to the decrease m the allocation effective that period (the equilibrium predications are shown below in Table 2 ). In order for a given outcome to be Pareto efficient, the permits redeemed must be matched with the highest possible redemption values. For example, panel (b) shows that under the periods 1-6
Myopic outcome, the 48 permits must be matched with redemption values of 300 or greater. But inspection of panel (a) reveals that in periods 1-6, New technology firms are allocated permits that are matched with redemption values of less than 300, while Old technology firms have redemption values greater than 300 for which they are not allocated permits. Thus trades must occur between the Old and New technology firms to allow the maximal myopic gains fkom trade to be realized. Table 2 Summarizes the per-period predictions under each of our benchmark outcomes. Profit and trading efficiency predictions are also included. Trading efficiency is expressed as a percent of a Those redemption values greater than 300 but not marked with a V" are matched with an allocated permit.
Similarly, those redemptions values less than 300 but not marked with an "A" are redemption values that are not matched with allocated permits. For simplic@, we denote only those values and permits that would result in trade at the competitive equilibrium.
The reader will note that there is not a unique ordering of permits that must be banked, ie., the intertemporal equilibrium requires only that 12 of the 18 permits allocated to values less than 425 be banked in periods 1-6. Numerous combinations meet this requirement. For simplicity, panel (d) of Figure 1 shows that the banked permits to be those matched with the lowest redemption values. These values are not allocated permits aftex the 50% reduction effective beginning period 7. As discussed above, trades could occur in either the double auction or the revenue-neutral auction. In the double auction (hereafter DA), firms negotiate bilateral trades on a public exchange.
Finns may submit electronic bids and asks anytime during the auction (subject to inventory and cash constraints). The highest standing bid and lowest standing ask are displayed on each computer screen. A trade occurs when a buyer accepts the standing ask, or a seller accepts the standing bid.
After a trade, both the standing bid and the standing ask are cleared, and the auction is open for new bids and asks. A history of prices is displayed at the bottom of the screen; all trades are for single permits.
The revenue neutral auction (hereafter RNA) is a sealed-bid discriminative auction. At the start of the auction, the computer screen displays the nwber of permits for sale. Recall that each fhm is required to withhold 16% of their per-period allocation for sale m the RNA; €ixms are not allowed to vohmtarily submit additional p e d s for sale.7 Next, firms submit private bids for permits.
After a l l bids have been submitted, the computer ranks them fiom high to low. In periods 1-6 (7-12),
T h e DAhas proven to be avery eflicient trading institution in a wide variety of laboratory market environments. See Davis and Holt (1993) for further discussion; for an exception see Van Boening and Wilcox (1 995).
' Although the RNA3 software does allow subjects to voluntady submit permits to the RNA, in addition to the involuntary submission, it does not allow subjects to assign a reservation price to any permits submitted to the RNA.
EbentiaIly, this procedure assigns a reservation price of zero. Under the CAAA, permits submitted involuntarily have a reservation price of zero, but permits submitted voluntarily may have a positive reservation price. As we felt that allowing voluntary submission without a reservation price was too far fiom the CAAA framework, we did not allow voluntary submission. I n -, in the RNA auctions conducted by the EPA to date, there have been few permits sold that were voluntdy submitted W.S. GAO (1994), Utility Environment Report (199511. Furthermore, Cason (1993, 1995) shows that sellers in the EPA auction have an incentive to state reservation prices below their true cost of emission control, and Cason and Plott (1996) provide laboratory evidence that this can produce downward bias in EPA auction prices. the highest eight (four) bids are accepted. Winning bidders pay the amount of their bid.
The total revenue collected fiom the RNA is then distributed to those h n s who sold permits m the auction. The distxiiution is made on an average price basis: the total revenue is divided by the number of permits sold, and sellers receive that average price for each permit they sell. Thus the auction is "revenue neutral," as the auctioneer receives zero proceeds fiom conducting the auction, and all sellers receive the same per-unit price. This distribution scheme is identical to that mandated in the CAAA for permits forced into the RNA.
Therefore, in summary each trading period involved the same &e basic steps (also refer to Step 2. Double Auction. After all subjects review their permit holdings, the DA is opened and subjects are allowed to trade. The DA is closed after three minutes; the time remaining until the close is shown on the computer screens. After the close, current permit holdings are again shown on the individual computer screens. Subjects can also view a display of their redemption values.
Revenue Neutral Auction. After all subjects review their permit holdings, the RNA is opened Once all subjects have submitted their bids, the computer determines the winning bidders. The amount of the bid is deducted fkom each winning bidder's cash account, and the proceeds are redistriiuted amongst sellers on an average price basis (see above). After the RNA, the bids are displayed on the individual computer screens; winning bids are highlighted.
Redemption and banking: decision. Next, the individual screens display the current permit holdings and redemption values. Each subject mdicates the number of p e d s to be redeemed, and the number to be banked as inventory for the next period. (The software allows subjects to experiment with different redemption and banking scenarios prior to making their finaI decisions.) Once all subjects make their redemption and banking decisions, their inventory and cash accounts are updated accordingly, and the market proceeds to the next trading period.
Experimental Procedure.
A session begins with an instruction period followed by a twelve period market. After all subjects arrive for the session, they are randomly assigned to a private computer carrel. Once everyone completes the self-paced computerized instructions, the fkst trading period begins. In the market, subjects can trade and redeem permits, using the RNA3 software, for experimental dollars.
At the end of a session, each subject's net dollar holdings are translated into U.S. currency (paid in cash) using a private exchange rate. (The exchange rate is explained during the instruction period.) Subjects are paid their respective eamhgs and excused. In our sessions, earnings per subject were m the $20-$35 range, mcluding a $5 "Show-up fee" to encourage prompt arrival.* Our sessions lasted about two to two and one-halfhours.
Previous pollution permit experiments have employed various methods to help subjects understand this relatively complex market (Elliott, 1993) . In this study, potential subjects participate in a six-period training session, typically between one day and one week before participating in one of the "data" sessioDs Shorn in Table 1 . The number of subjects per session ranged between four and twelve. (We allow the number of subjects to vary in these sessions, as our objective is trainin& not data CoIlectioa) There are four f i r m types with redemption values that are similar, but not identical, to those we use m our data sessions. Also, high (low) output firms receive eight (four) permits, and allocations are reduced by 50% after the midpoint period. Thus the training markets jncfude the important characteristics of the data sessions.
Subjects that earn more than the "no trade" earnings are iuvited to participate in another session. The "no trade" earnings are the amount the subject would e m ifhe/she newer traded p d s , and simply redeemed her allocation at the end of each trading period. E a subject could earn more than this amount, then (apparently) she could use trading to M e r bene&. Over 80% of subjects that completed one of our tmhhg sessions met this quali6ication.
As shown at the bottom of Table 1 , we ran sixteen replications of our market. Eight of those * The exchange rates were chosen so that earnings m the intertemporal competitive equilibrium would cover the appommity cost of participation in the experiment. Of course, whether or not that equilibrium was achieved depended on subjects' decisions. Also, one might argue that the opportunity costs of Los Angeles subjects diEm fiom Oxford, Mississippi subjects. The nature of the study specified exact replication at the two separate sites. Thus we used the exact same parameters at both sites.
sessions were conducted at the University of Mississippi, and eight were conducted at the University of Southern California. Eight human subjects (two for each firm) participated in each individual session. The 128 subjects were women and men recruited fiom the respective school's business courses; most of the subjects were undergraduates, but a few graduate students also participated.
Results.

I Replicability of Results.
The total profits calculated at the end of the final period were used to determine if the observed differences in estimated profits between universities, replications within universities, firms or technologies within replications,' and subjects within firms (technologies) were random and were not subject to experimental bias (see appendix 2). A statistical technique called analysis ofvariance was used for this purpose. The object of this technique is to break up the total variation into components due to each of the factors and then compare them by the F-test. In this case the total variation was decomposed into variation between the universities, between replications within universities, between firms within replications and Universities, between technologies within replications and universities, between subjects within firms, replications, and universities, between subjects within technologies, replications, and universities.
The averages for each cell and, within each university-specific replication, the averages for each type of finn and for each type of technology are readily obtained (Table 3) Table 4 ). The small F-values show no significant difference between universities, and also that within a university there was not a signiscant difference between replicates. The differences between technologies and jirms is highly significant. In this section we examine jirst the obsexved efficiency against the theoretical benchmark. We use as our measure of efficiency the subjects' aggregate profit as a percentage of the Intertemporal profit maximum. Other benchmarks tested indude number of permits banked (and therefore the number redeemed), and the price of permits in both the DA and RNA auctions. The predictions follow fiom the experimental parameters selected for these experiments as seen in Appendix 1.
Benchmark predictions are constructed assuming that each subject makes the optimal decision at all stages of the experiment. That is, each subject buys, sells, redeems and banks just as standard economic theory would predict.
Column (2) of Table 5 indicates that overall efficiency ranges fiom a low of 79.4 percent in One reason that efficiency often fids to improve substantially above 85 percent is that permit banking is fkr fiom optimal. Figure 2 summarizes the average banking balances by period across the 16 sessions relative to the intertemporal optimal benchmark. Recall that for the first 6 periods subjects should bank an additional 12 permits per period, and for the final 6 periods they should draw down this banked balance by 12 permits per period. The average balance of banked permits is less than one-half of this optimal level m periods 2 through 8, and the data reject the theoretical prediction in all but periods 1 and 2. Column (3) of Figure 1) . Thus, for these, the equilibrium price is shown as a range rather than a single value.
UMS-
that replication of this type is not often undertaken in experimental economics researck even more rare are experiments that have replication as a central focus. We expect that other researchers in this field will, like us, take comfort in this finding.
Second, it identifies a remarkably robust behavioral pattern across a relatively large set of independent experimental sessions. Market prices typically fall short of (exceed) the intertemporal competitive equilibrium price prediction prior to (after) the pre-announced reduction in permits, and are drawn more closely to the myopic competitive equilibrium prediction. As discussed in the introduction, these price patterns are remarkably similar to the early experiences of the allowance market in the field. Of course, the experiment deliberately simplified the field environment in dozens of dimensions, so we draw these parallels with caution.
We see several valuable directions for follow-up work. The price disparity between the DA and the RNA may create an environment where speculative buying and selling of permits may be profitable. This type of speculative opportunity also exits between the early and late periods where the prices climb in response to the change in initial allocation. Both of these speculative opportunities deserve further in depth examination. Further, most laboratory studies have focused on one specific trading institution at a time, so most research questions regarding the interaction of trading institutions remain unanswered.
Finally, it may be useful to conduct experiments w i t h additional features of the market institutions employed in SO, allowance trading in the field. For example, one could replace the continuous double auction market of the present experiment w i t h a continuous brokered search market; and one could allow voluntary transmission of units to the sealed-bid auction with minimum asking prices and the pricing rules studied in Cason (1995) . The EPA encourages trading in allowances with future effective dates, so it could be useful to conduct a simultaneous futures market. Porter and Smith (1995) 
